This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece's municipalities. We construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a dynamic panel data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local government finances. Our results are robust in the face of a series of controls including mayors running for reelection, their political alignment with the central government, and prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our investigation to the post-Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies influence incumbents' reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year opportunistic excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of opportunistic public finances management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated budgetary decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts.
Introduction
Greece's economic and political environment is characterized, inter alia, by weak institutions, extensive opportunistic behavior by incumbents, substantial rent-seeking (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2009) , clientelism, and cronyism (Phelps, 2015) . Such concerns may also afflict local government politics, which in Greece are closely associated with national politics. This paper focuses on Greek municipal budgets and pre-electoral manipulation of public finances as one manifestation of such phenomena. It considers the presence of politically induced opportunistic cycles in municipal fiscal policies. In addition, it examines how these electorally motivated budgetary policies affect mayors' reelection prospects. We construct a new dataset from primary sources, which covers 109 municipalities from 1985 to 2004 and corresponds to half of Greece's population. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to identify Political Budget Cycles (PBCs) in Greece's municipalities and to consider the expenditures' impact on mayors' reelection prospects.
Our focus on Greek municipalities provides some unique insights in Greece's political economy. First, our newly collected data allow us to investigate the presence of PBCs at the municipal level in the context of an advanced economy with a long history of political instability, weak institutions and high levels of political polarization. Second, studying Greece allows us to test if changes in the institutional framework, in this case the constraints implied by the country's effort to join the Economic and Monetary Union, had any effect on the opportunistic policies at the municipal level. Third, our data allow us to study the impact of elections on borrowing by the municipalities, a budget element absent from many other relevant studies. Although the magnitude of municipal borrowing is very limited in the case of Greece, it is nevertheless indicative of incumbents' opportunistic behavior. Fourth, given that local and national politics in Greece are closely related, we are able to systematically investigate how the interactions (alignment) between the different layers of government affect the size of the opportunistic cycle. Fifth, since no term limits apply for Greek mayors, we study the previously unexplored effects that a prolonged incumbency may have on the magnitude of municipal PBCs. Finally, as a key element of all reforms pertaining to local government in Greece over the last two decades has been the reduction in their number on the grounds of efficiency, we explicitly test whether small municipalities are more conducive to the presence of PBCs or not.
Our evidence suggests that mayors in Greece manipulate fiscal policy prior to elections as the budget balance deteriorates during election years, while total expenditures, its highly visible investment component and municipal borrowing all increase. The electoral effects on investment expenditures appear more pronounced when the mayor is aligned to the central government ruling party or when he is running for another term, while no evidence exists that the magnitude of the PBC is affected by prolonged incumbency. Our analysis also shows that PBCs are present in the post-Maastricht era and that their existence is robust to the exclusion of smallsized municipalities from our sample.
We also examine how the electorally motivated budgetary policies affect mayors'
reelection prospects. Our evidence shows that both increased expenditures over the full term and election year opportunistic deviations have a positive effect on mayors' reelection prospects. This finding can explain both the emergence of political budget cycles and the persistent mismanagement of local public finances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the relevant literature for PBCs at the local government level and the effects of opportunistic policies on incumbents' reelection possibilities. Section 3 provides some highlights on Greece's local government institutions and political framework.
Section 4 discusses our newly constructed dataset and estimation strategy for the detection of PBCs, while Section 5 presents and discusses the results of our analysis.
Section 6 considers whether municipal expenditures affect mayors' reelection prospects. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Literature Survey

Political Budget Cycles at the Local Government Level
Political Budget Cycles emerge due to opportunistically motivated incumbents who try to enhance voters' economic well-being before elections (Franzese and Jusko, 2006) as evidence suggests that economic conditions influence government support. This link, known as "economic voting", has been studied with the help of voting and popularity functions (VP-functions) that explain government support
(either in elections or polls) as a function of political and economic outcomes (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994) . 1
While recent research identifies several PBC determinants at the national level 2 , there is a growing literature considering political cycles at the local level where greater homogeneity in government structure, available policy instruments (Veiga and Veiga, 2007a) and uniformity in electoral rules and dates (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011) are present. For instance, Blais and Nadeau (1992) show that in Canada provincial governments' spending on social services and infrastructure construction increases during election years. Similarly, Galli and Rossi (2002) A number of other papers study explicitly the emergence of PBCs at the level of municipal administrative entities. Veiga and Veiga (2007a) produce evidence of electoral effects in Portuguese municipalities. Their results show that elections have a 1 Kramer (1971) , Fair (1978) , Madsen (1980) and Lewis-Beck (1988) are among the first who provide evidence in support of the economic voting hypothesis. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) review early evidence and conclude that VP-functions can explain government support when voters hold the government responsible for the economic conditions. Evidence from recent studies are also consistent with the economic voting hypothesis. See for example Swank and Eisinga (1999) , Feld and Kirchgässner (2000) , Chappell and Veiga (2000) and Tucker (2001) . For a review of recent evidence see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013) . 2 For instance, Shi and Svensson (2006) focus on the level of economic development, Persson and Tabellini (2003) on constitutional features, Brender and Drazen (2005) on the age of democracy, Alt and Lassen (2006) on the transparency of fiscal institutions, Streb et al., (2009) on the effectiveness of checks and balances, while Rose (2006) on fiscal rules. For a review of the literature see Drazen (2000) , Franzese and Jusko (2006) , and De Haan and Klomp (2013) . M A N U S C R I P T 
Political Budget Cycles and Reelection Prospects
If opportunistic/electoral concerns can affect budgetary policies at the local government level, a natural question arises as to how rewarding opportunism is. A closely related to the PBC, but usually separate, strand of the literature focuses on whether higher pre-electoral expenditures are beneficial for the incumbent or not. The evidence is somewhat mixed as results both in favor and against this hypothesis have been reported. Peltzman (1992) , for instance, argues that US voters are averse to higher spending as they actually penalize officials for increased spending before elections. Brender and Drazen (2008) Other studies, however, that focus on local governments find that pre-electoral budget manipulation can be rewarding. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) document that increases in the size of fiscal cycles positively affects an incumbent's probability of reelection in Russia's regional elections. Likewise Veiga and Veiga (2007b) , show that in Portuguese municipalities election year increases in investment expenditures are associated with higher vote percentages for the incumbents. probability of re-election. Table A1 in Appendix A.
Greece's Municipal Institutions and Political Framework
Empirical Model Specification and Estimation Method
We use a typical model of PBCs (e.g., Shi and Svensson, 2006; Veiga and Veiga, 2007a ; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011) specified as:
( 1) where the dependent variable denotes one of the j fiscal variables in municipality (Kiviet, 1995; Nickell, 1981) . Given that the time length of our panel is 20 years, the use of the Fixed Effects estimator in the context of a dynamic model may give rise to a non-negligible bias. To address this possibility, we employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system GMM estimator for dynamic panel data (see also, Shi and Svensson, 2006; Veiga and Veiga, 2007a; Efthyvoulou, 2012) . This estimator augments the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator using lagged differences of the dependent variables as instruments in the levels equations in addition to lagged levels of the dependent variables, which are used as instruments for the equations in first differences (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Baltagi, 2008) .
Since the estimated standard errors of the two step GMM estimator tend to be severely downward biased, we correct the bias using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction (see Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009a) . To avoid misleading results caused by instrument proliferation, we collapse the instrument set, as suggested by Roodman (2009b) , to reduce the number of moment conditions. Finally, we perform the Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals and the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions. The following section considers whether the magnitude of the opportunistic cycle depends on various factors that either enhance incumbents' incentives for electioneering or impede their ability to pursue such policies. We focus on whether political cycles vary with mayors' political alignment with the central government, their running for another term or not, and the number of years in office (prolonged incumbency).
Results and Discussion
Baseline Evidence
<Table 1 about here>
Running for Another Term, Political Alignment and Prolonged Incumbency
A mayor's decision to run for another term or not may affect the presence and/or magnitude of political cycles. Rosenberg (1992) argues that incumbents who do not seek reelection generate larger political cycles as they try to secure gains for the postelection period. On the other hand, Veiga and Veiga (2007a) show that the presence of political cycles and their magnitude in Portuguese municipalities are not affected by whether a mayor opts for reelection or not.
To test if a mayor's decision to run for another term affects the magnitude of the electoral effect we allow Elections to interact with a dummy variable (ReCandidate), which takes the value of one when the mayors run for reelection and zero otherwise.
Evidence presented in 
Fiscal Manipulation and Reelection Prospects
Data and Estimation Method
Having identified a robust opportunistic element in the finances of Greek municipalities, we examine the potency of such policies in terms of their effect on electoral outcomes. A positive response of the public to pre-election spending hikes reinforces the incumbents' incentives for manipulating the public finances. To investigate whether and how the management of public finances at the local government level affects incumbents' reelection prospects in Greece, we consider data on election outcomes from the aforementioned 109 municipalities. The dataset ranges from 1985 to 2004, includes 5 electoral years (i.e., 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002) and covers four full governing periods. Thus, the dataset permits us to investigate how local finances affect reelection possibilities in four out of five elections included in our sample. We employ a fixed effects logit approach for the panel of Greek Municipalities used before, specified in Equation (2) We focus on the effects of two fiscal variables, namely Total Expenditures and Investment Expenditures over the full term as well as the effect of opportunistic increases that occur during election years. To investigate the latter, we follow the approach of Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) (Greene, 2002) . The Hausman test in our case rejects the homogeneity restriction (that is, the homogeneity hypothesis) and
suggests the inclusion of fixed effects. Using this procedure reduces the sample size since only municipalities where mayors have won and lost elections can be used in the estimation. 13
Results and Discussion
We present the estimation results in Table 3 . The baseline specification in Column 1 shows that greater fiscal expansions during an incumbent's term, as manifested by 13 This reduces our sample to 80 municipalities. increases in Total Expenditures, affect positively the probability of reelection.
Regarding the other variables considered, the evidence suggests that increases in government levied taxes negatively affect incumbents' reelection prospects, while higher levels of revenues from governmental direct transfers (GovSubsidies) affect them positively. The variables capturing the population structure do not affect the reelection prospects of incumbents. The amount of time that an incumbent has spent in office, however, strongly affects his reelection prospects. The corresponding coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that incumbents are subject to diminishing popularity over repeated terms and prolonged incumbency. 14 Column (2) reports the results from distinguishing between average expenditures in the first three years and the percentage deviation of election year expenditures from this average. The two coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding is comparable to evidence from other studies (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008; Veiga and Veiga, 2007b) . The remaining control variables display results that are qualitatively similar to those in Column 1. in Column (4) suggest that this is also the case for average pre-electoral Investment Expenditures and election year deviations. This finding is interesting given that other related studies find that it is the visible expenditures that affect re-election the most (Aidt et al., 2011) . We attribute this difference to Greece's institutional features where for a long period of time some investments that are associated with local government activities were undertaken by local development corporations that draw on a different budget and operated in a non-transparent environment. 15 The other coefficients are the same as before.
<Table 3 about here>
Our results, consistent with several other studies that provide evidence that preelectoral expenditures are electorally rewarded (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008; Veiga and Veiga, 2007b) , document that in the case of Greece's municipalities higher pre-electoral expenditures and election year opportunistic deviations are beneficial for incumbent's reelection. This finding can partly explain the emergence of budget cycles and thus the prolonged mismanagement in Greece's local finances.
Further Evidence and Robustness Checks
We first examine whether Greece's effort to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has restricted opportunistic politics at the local level, 16 as this process may imply additional commitments and constitutional restrictions. 17 We restrict our sample to the years after 1993 that cover Greece's run up to joining the EMU and the first four years after its admission. The results are similar to those of the baseline model and we report them in Appendix A, Table A2 , Columns (1)-(4).
Since the extensive municipal mergers in Greece were introduced to tackle concerns over inefficiencies stemming from the small size of municipalities, we additionally test whether the presence of electoral effects is driven by the inclusion of small municipalities in our sample. We remove municipalities with a population smaller than 10,000 inhabitants, 18 with results reported in columns (4)-(8) of Table   A2 (please see Appendix A), being similar to those presented in Table 1 .
<Table A2 about here>
Turning now to the full dimension of our panel, we perform a series of additional robustness tests. First, as some of the policies may require substantial time to yield electoral results, we add a dummy variable to capture the effect of the year before 16 For the effect of the Maastricht Treaty on economic voting see Veiga (2013) . 17 With regard to specific restrictions, fiscal rules, imposed by national governments to local administrative entities Grembi et al. (2012) study how policy outcomes are affected by them focusing on municipal governments in Italy. Their evidence suggest that fiscal rules can reduce debt accumulation as their relaxation has a negative effect on the budget through a fall in tax revenues. 18 We exclude population category 4 municipalities as the average population after the last reform is approximately 30.000 citizens falling into population category 3.
elections. Results show that this dummy has a positive and statistically significant effect on Total Expenditures, Investment Expenditures, and Borrowing, while the effect of Elections remains qualitatively the same as in Table 1 . Our results are robust to the inclusion of regional GDP per capita 19 and regional level of unemployment in our model, suggesting that expenditures are procyclical as regional GDP per capita positively affects Total Expenditures. When we replace the Years as Mayor variable with the number of consecutive terms that a mayor has served, results are qualitatively the same as in our baseline model. This is also the case when we substitute our Ideology variable with two separate dummies that capture when the mayor is of Left wing and Right wing political orientation. Finally, we replace our
PopCat variable with municipal population. Results remain qualitatively the same as in our baseline specification. 20
To test the robustness of our results on the effect of opportunistic policies on election outcomes, we restrict our sample by excluding small municipalities (PopCat=4) and the 1990 municipal elections. The results presented in Table A3 (Appendix A), remain qualitatively the same as in Table 3 , indicating that opportunistic policies were electorally beneficial for Greek mayors in the post-Maastricht era.
<Table A3 about here>
Conclusion
We provide evidence of opportunistically motivated policies in Greek municipalities. We first consider the presence of PBCs in Greece's municipalities, constructing a dataset from raw data that covers 20 years and half of the country's population. The evidence produced shows an opportunistic PBC pattern in the budget balance, in total and investment expenditures, and in borrowing revenues. PBCs emerge in Greece's municipalities regardless of whether the mayors run for reelection or not, or whether the incumbents are politically aligned with the central government or not. Moreover, prolonged incumbencies do not appear to affect municipal finances and the magnitude of PBCs. The evidence also shows that Greece's effort to join the EMU had no effect on local opportunistic politics. The results are robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities from our sample. This finding is interesting given that a key concern permeating all recent attempts to reform local governments in Greece was the merging of smaller into larger units.
We Table 1 Political budget cycles (PBCs) in Greek municipalities: Baseline results.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with finite-sample correction for the two step covariance matrix as developed by Windmeijer (2005) . Instruments collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009b Notes: See Table 3 A  We construct a new dataset and find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation.
 The results are robust in the face of a series of controls.
 Opportunistic behavior appears impervious to various municipal reform attempts.
 Opportunistic policies have also been electorally rewarding.
